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NOTES

THE FIRST PRONG'S EFFECT ON THE DOCKET:
HOW THE SECOND CIRCUIT SHOULD MODIFY
THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK IN
TITLE VII REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

I. INTRODUCTION

Mark was hired by a state corrections department as a correctional
I
officer in 1985.1 Eight years later, he was promoted to sergeant. 2 After
another eight years, he was promoted to lieutenant.' Sixteen years later,
a full twenty years after he was hired, Mark became Watch Commander,
one of the highest-ranking positions during his 3-11 p.m. shift.4 That
same year, he was unceremoniously terminated after being involved in
an altercation with a prisoner. Three other corrections officers involved
in the altercation-all of a different race than Mark--eventually returned
to work.6 All four had received a Notice of Discipline recommending
termination, but only Mark was terminated. A subsequent arbitration
denied his grievance, and found him guilty of insubordination, filing a
false report, and making false statements under oath.8 Mark filed state
and federal employment discrimination claims, alleging he was

1. Adamczyk v.N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., No. 07-CV-523S, 2011 WL 917980, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2011), aff'd, 474 F. App'x 23 (2d Cir. 2012).

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *2.
6. Id. at *3.
7. Id. at *2-3.
8. Id. at *2. The other three COs also were found to have filed false reports and made false
statements under oath. Id.
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terminated because of his race. 9 Mark is also white.10 Is Mark a
member of a protected class under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 despite his status as a "majority" plaintiff?" The answer depends
not on the Act itself, but on the jurisdiction in which Mark's case will be
tried.
The above facts illustrate the fact pattern in a recent federal district
court case wherein the plaintiff alleged reverse discrimination in an
adverse employment action.12
The term "reverse discrimination"
became a part of the cultural landscape in 1974 shortly after the Supreme
Court's decision in DeFunis v. Odegaard.13 Columnist James J.
Kilpatrick, who wrote about the case concerning a claim of racial bias in
law school admissions, said that the "more familiar name for this
abnormality is 'reverse discrimination.' The short and ugly word is
racism."1 4 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, various publications and
politicians used the term, which eventually lost its quotation marks and
became an accepted term on its own.15 Academic commentators have
given the term several explanations, including "'discrimination against
members of the white majority' . . . '[p]referential hiring practices' . . .

'the removal of that benefit which American society has for so long
bestowed without questions, upon its privileged classes' [and]
'[p]rejudice or bias exercised against a person or class for purpose of
correcting a pattern of discrimination against another person or
class ....

One commentator has suggested that reverse discrimination is a
"covert political term which should be removed from the writings of any
serious academician or lay-person[,]" arguing that it is not an expression
neutral in tone with a commonly accepted meaning.17 Congress intended
Title VII to apply to both white and non-white men and women,' 8 and

9.

Id. at *1.

10.

See id.

1 1.

See id. at *5.

12. See id.at *1, *5.
13. 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Philip L. Fetzer, 'Reverse Discrimination':The Political Use of
Language, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 293,297-98 (1992).
14. See Fetzer, supra note 13, at 298.
15. Id. Fetzer cites a 1976 issue of U.S. News & World Report commenting on .'apractice
known as reverse discrimination' without defining exactly what it meant, and then-Republican
presidential nominee Ronald Reagan commenting during his first run for presidency that same year
that '[i]f you happen to belong to an ethnic group not recognized by the Federal Government as
entitled to special treatment you are a victim of reverse discrimination."' Id.
16. Id. at 298-99 (footnotes omitted).
17. Id. at 294.
18. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (citing 110 CONG.
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the U.S. Supreme Court soon after interpreted the terms of Title VII as
prohibiting racial discrimination against white persons upon the same
standards as non-white persons.' 9 However, circuit courts are sharply
divided on whether a majority plaintiff alleging reverse discrimination in
adverse employment actions must satisfy his or her Title VII protected
class status by the same standard as minority plaintiffs, or whether a
majority plaintiff must provide additional "background circumstances."20
Whether the term is reflective of political ideologies or policy
preferences will not be addressed here. Rather, this Note will approach
the term in a strictly jurisprudential manner, through the lens of the first
prong of the burden-shifting analysis cemented by the Supreme Court's
decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.21 Specifically, this
Note serves to determine which standard the Second Circuit should
expressly adopt when modifying the first prong of the McDonnell
Douglas framework in reverse discrimination claims.22 Where most
federal circuits have adopted either a "background circumstances," 2 3 a
modification of "background circumstances,"24 or a sufficient
evidence" standard,2 5 the Second Circuit has consistently avoided the
issue and remained silent.26
Part II discusses a brief history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the original intent of the Act as primarily demonstrated
through legislative history and early Supreme Court decisions, as well as
early Supreme Court cases that interpreted Title VII as applying to
members of all races, along with the prima facie elements of a Title VII
employment discrimination claim established by McDonnellDouglas.
Part III explains the modification of the first element of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case,27 and will discuss the decision by
REc. 2578 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler)).
19. See McDonald,427 U.S. at 278-80. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971) ("Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only
what Congress has proscribed."); EEOC Decision No. 74-31, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1326
(1973), 1973 WL 3907 (recognizing that all individuals must have equal notice of existing job
opportunities).
20. Compare ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999), with Parker v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
21. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
22. See infra Part VI.
23. See Parker,652 F.2d at 1017.
24. See Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 590 (10th Cir. 1992).
25. See ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 161.
26. See Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 80 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009).
27. "The complainant in a Title V1I trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he
belongs to a racial minority. .. ." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
Co.28 to impose upon a majority plaintiff the additional burden of
proving "background circumstances," as well as circuits that have
strictly followed suit, circuits that have modified the "background
circumstances" standard, and the Third Circuit's rejection of the Parker
standard in ladimarcov. Runyon. 2 9
Part IV closely examines the Second Circuit in terms of the
guidance it has provided, as well as several cases from this circuit's
district courts and how they have adapted this area of jurisprudence and
interpreted the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Part V
analyzes which standard the Second Circuit should expressly adopt:
Parker's "background circumstances," a modified approach introduced
in the Tenth Circuit by Notari v. Denver Water Department,30 or reject
"background circumstances" entirely and follow the ladimarco
"sufficient evidence" approach. 3' Part VI weighs each argument and
concludes that the Second Circuit should adopt the Jadimarco"sufficient
evidence" framework.
II. PROTECTIONS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII

A. Title VII Protections
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees from
discriminatory employment practices, specifically providing, in pertinent
part, that "[it] shall be an unlawful employment practice ... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . ."3 2 Congress passed
Title VII to prevent employment discrimination against historically
disfavored minorities.
Legislators were concerned about the pervasive obstacles that
African Americans faced historically, and the resulting harm of stagnant

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
190 F.3d at 160.
971 F.2d 585, 590 (10th Cir. 1992).
Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 163.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
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and dismal employment prospects.34 Senator Hubert Humphrey, who
sponsored the Act in the Senate, stated that "[t]he crux of the problem is
to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which
have been traditionally closed to them. . . . Title VII is designed to give

Negroes ... a fair chance to earn a livelihood and contribute their talents
to the building of a more prosperous America."3 Other supporters, such
as Representative William McCulloch, stressed the need to remove
barriers in employment for African Americans.36 Congressional debates
on Title VII demonstrate that Congress was primarily concerned with the
number of African Americans in low-skill jobs and "the manner in
which racial discrimination helped to perpetuate [their] low status in
employment."37
The Supreme Court stated unambiguously that "[t]he language of
Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."3 Further, the
objective of Title VII "was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor
an identifiable group of white employees over other employees." 39
However, the Court has also explained that:
[T]he Act does not command that any person be hired simply because
he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a
member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any
group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has

proscribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification. 40
Finally, the Court has held that there are broad, overriding societal
and personal interests, "shared by employer, employee, and
consumer ... [in] efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured
34. See 110 CONG. REc. 1512 (1964) (statement of Rep. Madden).
35. 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964).
36. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When Different Means the Same: Applying a Diferent
Standard of Proofto White Plaintiffs Under the McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test, 50
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 53, 61 (1999).
37. Id.
38. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
39. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971).
40. Id. at 430-31 (emphasis added).
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through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions." 4'
"In the implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title
VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise."42
B. Legislative History
The scope of Title VII is not limited to one class of individuals,
despite its primary purpose of helping minorities.43 While debating the
bill in the House of Representatives, Democratic Representative Manny
Cellar declared: "The legislation before you seeks ...

to honor the

constitutional guarantees of equality under the law .... It bestows no
preference on any one group; what it does is to place into balance the
scales of justice so that the living force of our Constitution shall apply to
all people .... "" In congressional debates, supporters of Title VII
stressed its inclusiveness and expressly provided that it was meant to
protect a broad range of individuals, regardless of race, including
Caucasians.45 Representative Celler made it clear that Title VII was
intended to "cover white men and white women and all Americans." 46
Other legislators stated that Title VII created an "obligation not to
discriminate against whites."47
If, for example, the International Longshoremen's Association ...
which is predominantly white, permitted no Negro members, they
would come under this act. This situation is exactly the same if the
colored International Longshoremen's organization .. . discriminated
against a white person who is qualified for membership. Both are clear
examples of discrimination. It works both ways.48
Some commentators have gone further to argue that, despite the
bill's purpose and focus on African Americans, it is unlikely that Title
VII would have been enacted if it only protected minorities from
discrimination.49 Proponents of this view argue that the legislative
41. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 801.
42. Id.
43. See Ryan M. Peck, Title VII Is Color Blind The Law of Reverse Discrimination,75 J.
KAN. B. ASS'N, no. 6, June 2006 at 20, 21.
44. Id. at21.
45. 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler).
46. Id.
47. 110 CONG. REC. 7218 (1964) (memorandum of Sen. Clark).
48. 110 CONG. REC. 2552 (statement of Rep. Celler).
49. See Peck, supra note 43, at 21. "While there was strong support for Title VH, it likely
would not have been enacted if it had not been clear that Title VII prohibits all discrimination,
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history demonstrates an effort by legislators to stress the inclusiveness of
Title VII protections in order to gain political support.o Senator
Humphrey's proclamation may raise such an inference.
What the bill does . . . is simply to make it an illegal practice to use

race as a factor in denying employment. It provides that men and
women shall be employed on the basis of their qualifications, not as
Catholic citizens, not as Protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not
as colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States. 5 1
Finally, the language of the Act itself suggests that Congress
intended Title VII to protect all individuals, regardless of race. 52
According to the Act's plain language, any person, whether white or
black, can be a plaintiff in a Title VII case.53 If Congress had meant to
prohibit discrimination only against minorities or some other socially
disfavored group, it could have used narrower phrasing instead of
consistently and deliberately using the phrase "any individual." 4
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,ss the Supreme Court
ended any debate when it unequivocally held that a white plaintiff is
protected by Title VII and, therefore, is entitled to bring a claim to
The Court held that the terms of Title VII
enforce those protections.
"prohibit[ing] the discharge of any individual because of such
individual's race ... are not limited to discrimination against members
of any particular race." 57 The Court pointed to the Equal Employment

including reverse discrimination." Id.
50. Id. "To assuage the concerns of some of the conservative members of Congress, other
members emphasized Title VII's broad prohibitions against all discrimination." Id.
51.
110 CONG. REC. 13,088 (1964).
52. See Peck, supranote 43, at 21. Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . .. (1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual'srace, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006)).
53. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 36, at 59.
54. Peck, supra note 43, at 21.
55. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
56. Id. at 280.
57. Id. at 278-79 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The McDonald
opinion further noted that the Griggs Court was not confronted with racial discrimination against
whites but nevertheless described the Act as proscribing discriminatory preference for any racial
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Opportunity Commission's consistent interpretation of Title VII "to
proscribe racial discrimination in private employment against whites on
the same terms as racial discrimination against nonwhites," and agreed
"that to proceed otherwise would 'constitute a derogation of the
Commission's Congressional mandate to eliminate all practices which
operate to disadvantage the employment opportunities of any group
protected by Title VII, including Caucasians.""' The Court held that the
EEOC's conclusion "is in accord with uncontradicted legislative history
to the effect that Title VII was intended" to protect Caucasians, and all
Americans, from discriminatory employment practices. 5 9 The Court
therefore held "Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white
petitioners .

..

upon the same standards as would be applicable were

they Negroes and [the employee who was not terminated was] white." 60
C. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and the McDonnell Douglas
Framework
A plaintiff may rely upon either direct or indirect evidence to
establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII.6'
However, "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that an employer who
discriminates will almost never announce a discriminatory animus or
provide employees or courts with direct evidence of discriminatory
intent."6 2 A Title VII action will survive if there is sufficient indirect
evidence to satisfy the standard the Supreme Court set out in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.63
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case by proving:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to

group, whether it be minority or majority. Id. at 279.
58. Id at 279-80 (quoting EEOC Decision No. 74-31, 7 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1326
(1973), 1973 WL 3907, at *2).
59. McDonald,427 U.S. at 280.
60. Id
61. See, e.g., Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 590 (10th Cir. 1992).
62. Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1999).
63. See Notari, 971 F.2d at 590.
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seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
If the plaintiff has sufficient evidence to establish these four
elements, the Court will draw an inference of discrimination.'
The
burden then shifts to the employer who must "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."6 6 If the
employer can satisfy this burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to persuade the court that the employer's nondiscriminatory reason is
pretext for discrimination.67
In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff, a black man and long-time
civil rights activist, filed a formal complaint with the EEOC claiming
that the defendant-employer violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when
the defendant refused to rehire him. 68 The suit arose after the defendant
discharged the plaintiff in the course of a general reduction in work
force.69 Following his dismissal, the plaintiff "protested vigorously that
his discharge and the general hiring practices of petitioner were racially
motivated."7 0 Accompanied by like-minded activists, the plaintiff
orchestrated a "stall-in" whereby they purposefully stalled their cars on
the main roads leading to the defendant's plant in an effort to block
access to it during the morning shift change.71 Later, a "lock-in" was
organized and a chain and padlock were secured on the front door of a
building to prevent those inside, some of whom were defendant's
employees, from leaving. 72 Three weeks after the "lock-in," the
defendant-employer publicly advertised that they were looking for
mechanics with experience akin to the plaintiffs, and he re-applied for a
position.
The defendant denied plaintiffs application based on his
participation in the protests.74
The plaintiff filed suit shortly after his application was denied,
initially claiming violations of sections 703(a)(1) and 704(a) of the Civil
64. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
65. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
66. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
67. See id at 804 (Plaintiff must "be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the employer's]
stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretext.").
68. See id. at 794, 796.
69. See id. at 794. At McDonnell Douglas Corp., an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer that
employed over thirty thousand people, plaintiff worked as a lab technician and mechanic from 1956
until 1964. Id
70. Id
71. See id.
72. See id. at 795. "Though [plaintiff] apparently knew beforehand of the 'lock-in,' the full
extent of his involvement remains uncertain." Id.
73. See id at 796.
74. Id.
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Rights Act."
The district court dismissed the claim of racial
discrimination, but the Eighth Circuit reversed dismissal of the
plaintiffs claim under section 703(a)(1), holding that the plaintiff was
entitled to demonstrate that defendant's reasons for refusing to hire him
were mere pretext.7 6 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari
"[i]n order to clarify the standards governing the disposition of an action
challenging employment discrimination. ...
Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Powell explained that the case raised
"significant questions as to the proper order and nature of proof in
actions under Title VII. . .."" Citing Griggs, the Court reinforced the
proposition that Title VII was meant to protect minorities from racially
discriminatory employment practices.79 Noting inconsistency in the
lower courts,o the Court resolved the problem by establishing a burdenshifting framework allowing a plaintiff to establish an inference of
discrimination without direct evidence.
Commentators argue that the formulation of the prima facie case in
McDonnell Douglas reflects the legislative objectives of addressing a
particular pattern of discrimination against African Americans, as well
as the Civil Rights Act's broader purpose of protecting all individuals
from discrimination. 8 2 To properly apply the McDonnell Douglas
framework, courts should recognize the purpose of Title VII and the
reasoning that led Justice Powell and the other Justices to create it. 83 In
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,84 the Court explained:

75. Id. Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ..... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). Section 704(a), in pertinent part, provides: "It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (2006).
76. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 797-98.
77. Id at 798.
78. Id. at 793-94.
79. Id at 800.
80. "The two opinions of the Court of Appeals and the several opinions of the three the
judges of that court attempted, with a notable lack of harmony, to state the applicable rules as to
burden of proof and how this shifts upon the making of a prima facie case." Id. at 801.
81. See id. at 801-02.
82. See Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity PoliticsI: The Myth of the ProtectedClass
in Title VllDisparateTreatment Cases, 30 CoNN. L. REv. 441, 450-51 (1998).
83. See Onwuachi-Willig, supranote 36, at 64.
84. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors ... And we are willing to presume this largely
because we know from our experience that more often than not people
do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying
reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate
reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible
reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the
employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based
his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.

The McDonnell Douglas framework "was 'never intended to be
rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.'" 86 Instead, it was established to
provide fact finders with a sensible and orderly way to determine the
existence of discrimination in light of common experience.8 7 The use of
a common sense approach, regardless of its effectiveness, is one reason
why judicial modification is necessary in claims of employment
discrimination brought by non-minority plaintiffs.
D. "Reverse" Discrimination
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,88 the Supreme Court touched on the
possibility of a reverse discrimination claim.89

While Griggs did not

involve a reverse discrimination claim, the Court discussed the scope of
Title VII.90 The Court officially recognized reverse discrimination in
McDonald, which involved the termination of two white plaintiffs after
they were caught stealing cargo from one of the defendant's shipments91
The employees brought suit, alleging they were discriminated against
because a black employee who committed the same offense was
disciplined rather than discharged.92 Following the language of Griggs,
85. Id. at 577 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
86. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (quoting Furnco,
438 U.S. at 577).
87. Furnco,438 U.S. at 577.
88. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
89. Id. at 431 ("Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely
and only what Congress has proscribed.").
90. See id at 430-31. The Court found that an employer was prohibited by Title VII from
requiring a high school education or passing of a standardized general intelligence test as condition
of transfer or promotion due to disparate impact on African American employees. See id.
91. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 276, 279-80 (1976) (holding Title
VII is violated unless employment criteria are applied alike to all races).
92. See id. at 276.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2012

11

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 7

230

HOFSTRA LABOR & EAPLOYMENTLA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 30:219

the Court ultimately determined that "Title VII prohibits racial
discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same
standards as would be applicable were they Negroes and [the disciplined
employee] white."
The Court then turned to whether the white plaintiffs were entitled
to establish their claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 94
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall answered in the affirmative,
finding the facts "indistinguishable" from those in McDonnell
Douglas.95 The Court explained that the McDonnell Douglas framework
was applicable despite the fact that the plaintiffs could not meet the first
96..ofh
prong of the prima facie case, noting that "'specification ... of the
prima facie proof required ... is not necessarily applicable in every
Interestingly, the Court held
respect to differing factual situations. "'
that the first prong "of this sample pattern of proof was set out only to
demonstrate how the racial character of the discrimination could be
established in the most common sort of case, and not as an indication of
any substantive limitation of Title VII's prohibition on racial
discrimination."9 8 Ultimately, McDonald firmly established two key
principals: (1) Title VII protects whites from racial discrimination in
employment; and (2) white plaintiffs may use the McDonnell Douglas
framework to enforce those rights. 99
III. MODIFYING THE "MEMBER OF A PROTECTED CLASS" PRONG

McDonald gave little guidance on how the first prong of the prima
facie case should be changed in cases of reverse discrimination.' 00 If the
McDonnell Douglas framework were applied rigidly, reverse
discrimination claims would not exist because the first prong would
93. Id. at 280.
94. Seeidat281.
95. See id. at 282-83 ("Fairly read, the complaint asserted that petitioners were discharged for
their alleged participation in a misappropriation of cargo entrusted to Santa Fe, but that a fellow
employee, likewise implicated, was not so disciplined, and that the reason for the discrepancy in
discipline was that the favored employee is Negro while petitioners are white ... While Santa Fe
may decide that participation in a theft of cargo may render an employee unqualified for
employment, this criterion must be 'applied, alike to members of all races,' and Title VII is violated
if, as petitioners alleged, it was not.").
96. The first prong of the prima facie case requires that the plaintiff belong to a minority
group. Id. at 279 n.6.
97. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 n.13).
98. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6.
99. See id at 279-80, 282-83.
100. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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automatically disqualify majority plaintiffs.'o Such a result would be
contrary to the scope of Title VII, as well as the language of the Act
itself.
Circuit courts have recognized this dilemma and have responded by
modifying the first prong.10 2 However, "courts have struggled in
attempting to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
to Title VII suits by [w]hite plaintiffs, and no universally accepted
statement of the appropriate standard has emerged."' 0 3 Generally
speaking, circuit courts apply one of the following three standards: (a)
the "background circumstances" standard,'" (b) a modified "background
circumstances" standard,'s or (c) the "sufficient evidence" standard. 06
The following subsections will introduce each of these standards and
explain them in greater detail, including any substantive differences
within each general category.
A. Parker, Murray, and the "BackgroundCircumstances" Standard
In Parker, the D.C. Circuit established a new standard under the
McDonnell Douglas framework for white plaintiffs alleging reverse
discrimination. 0 7 The court explained that modification was justified
for several reasons. First, the court stated that the McDonnell Douglas
framework was "not an arbitrary lightening of the plaintiffs burden, but
rather a procedural embodiment of the recognition that our nation has
not yet freed itself from a legacy of hostile discrimination." 08 The court
then noted that the McDonnell Douglas framework was frequently
modified in a variety of discrimination claims in employment.'0 o
Modification was required in Parker because the plaintiff alleged that
his employer was giving illegal preference to black and female
coworkers."10 The court explained:

101. See Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1999).
102. See id.
at455.
103. Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1999).
104. See Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1981); Murray v.
Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985).
105. See Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1992); Mills, 171
F.3d at 457.
106. See ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 161.
107. See Parker,652 F.2d at 1017.
108. Id.
109. See id at 1017-18.
110. See id atl014.
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Membership in a socially disfavored group was the assumption on
which the entire McDonnell Douglas analysis was predicated, for only
in that context can it be stated as a general rule that the "light of
common experience" would lead a factfinder to infer discriminatory
motive from the unexplained hiring of an outsider rather than a group
member. Whites are also a protected group under Title VII, but it
defies common sense to suggest that the promotion of a black
employee justifies an inference of prejudice against white co-workers
in our present society."'I
The court then drew on its own precedent in Daye v. Harris,112
where it found that a majority plaintiff could utilize the McDonnell
Douglas criteria for proving a prima facie case without being required to
provide direct evidence of racially motivated favoritism." 3 Proof of
such circumstances serves as the equivalent of the first standard
expounded in McDonnell Douglas: membership in a racial minority." 4
Later, in Harding v. Gray,"' the D.C. Circuit attempted to clarify
two general categories of evidence that demonstrate "background
circumstances," concluding that either "evidence indicating that the
particular employer at issue has some reason or inclination to
discriminate invidiously against whites" or "evidence indicating that
there is something 'fishy' about the facts of the case at hand that raises
an inference of discrimination" would suffice.' 16 The court explained
that this approach was not meant to foreclose reverse discrimination
claims or to be an additional hurdle to white plaintiffs, but rather to serve
as a substitute for a minority plaintiff's burden under the first prong. 1
Evidence of the first category can be demonstrated by "political
pressure to promote a particular minority because of his race, pressure to
promote minorities in general, and proposed affirmative action plans.""'
Such evidence may be sufficient "where an employer was in the process
of drafting or adopting an affirmative action plan. .. in combination
with other factors, to the creation of sufficient 'background

Ill. Id.at1017.
112. 655 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
113. See Parker,652 F.2d at 1017-18.
114. Id. at 1018. The court referred to Daye to illustrate background circumstances sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of reverse discrimination in a case where the majority of defendant's
employees were black and they received a large proportion of promotions. Id at 1017.
115. 9F.3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
116. Id. at 153.
117. Id. at 154.
118. Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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circumstances.'"H 9 Of the second category enumerated in Harding, the
court found in Lanphear v. Prokop120 that evidence that a majority
plaintiff was given "little or no consideration" for a promotion, and that
a supervisor did not fully review qualifications for a minority promotee,
was sufficient to establish background circumstances. 12 1 In Bishopp v.
District of Columbia,12 2 evidence that a minority applicant was promoted
in an "unprecedented fashion" over four majority applicants who were
clearly more qualified was sufficient to establish background
circumstances. 123
In explaining the relative weight of evidence from either category
in Mastro v. Potomac Electric Power Co.,124 the court gave the plaintiff
the choice of establishing background circumstances by putting forth
evidence from either of the two general categories. 125 In addition,
evidence of these circumstances "may arise from either the employer's
general background or the background of the case at hand." 2 6 In
Harding, the court held that "if a more qualified white applicant is
denied promotion in favor of a minority applicant with lesser
qualifications, we think that in itself raises an inference that the
defendant is 'that unusual employer who discriminates against the
majority."'l27
The Sixth Circuit adopted a similar approach to the D.C. Circuit
following its decision in Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc. 128 In
Murray, the circuit court agreed with the lower court's use of Parker in
approving the use of background circumstances in reverse discrimination
claims.129 The court reasoned that the McDonnell Douglas framework
stems from congressional efforts "to address [the] nation's history of
discrimination against racial minorities, a legacy of racism so entrenched
130
that we presume acts, otherwise unexplained, embody its effect.',
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the purpose of Title VII justifies the
presumption of discrimination implicit in the McDonnell Douglas
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
R.R. Co.,
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 851 n.4 (citing Bishopp v. D.C., 788 F.2d 781, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
703 F.2d 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1315.
Bishopp, 788 F.2d at 781.
Id. at 786.
Mastro, 477 F.3d at 843.
Id at 852 (finding "evidence from both is not necessary.").
Id. at 852.
Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio
652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1981)).
770 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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framework.13 1 In a case of reverse discrimination, "[a]s with the
minority plaintiff, the majority plaintiff who asserts a claim of racial
discrimination ... does so within the historical context of the Act."13 2
Further, "reverse discrimination claims require application of a
McDonnell Douglas standard modified to reflect this context as well as
the factual situation of the claim."l 3 3 Thus, in the court's view, the
reverse discrimination plaintiff must demonstrate that, despite his
majority status, he was the victim of intentional discrimination.14
Since Murray, the Sixth Circuit has developed a two-part test of its
own to determine background circumstances under the modified first
prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework.13 5 The current test
provides:
[A] prima facie case of "reverse discrimination" is established upon a
showing [1] that "background circumstances support the suspicion that
the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the
majority" . . . and upon a showing [2] that the employer treated
differently employees who were similarly situated but not members of
the protected class. 136
To demonstrate that employees are similarly situated, the plaintiff is
required to show that "the relevant aspects of his employment situation
are nearly identical to those of the . . . employees who he alleges were
treated more favorably." 37 A determination of "similarly situated" can
rest on "differences in job title, responsibilities, experience, and work
record. 38
In Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., 139 the plaintiff
claimed reverse discrimination after he was demoted subsequent to
committing an employment violation, whereas a female employee who
committed the same violation was not similarly disciplined.14 0 Because

131. See id. "[T]he primary purpose of Title VII is 'to assure equality of employment
opportunities and to eliminate those discriminating practices and devices which have fostered
racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."' Id. (quoting
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
132. Murray, 770 F.2d at 67.
133. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Id. (citing Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
135. See Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 (6th Cir. 1994).
136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 802 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 691 (6th Cir. 2004).
139. Pierce,40 F.3d at 796.
140. See id. at 802.
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of the plaintiffs supervisory status, he was not considered "similarly
situated" to the female employee, and therefore failed to satisfy the
The "similarly situated"
background circumstances requirement. 14
requirement seems to create an additional hurdle for non-minority
plaintiffs, going beyond even what is required under Parker and its
progeny. In a telling admission, the court itself raised concerns about
the fairness of its own standard.142
B. Notari and the Modification ofBackground Circumstances
The Tenth and Seventh Circuits use a modified formulation of the
"background circumstances" standard that provides an alternative means
of establishing a prima facie case of reverse discrimination. Under
Notari, a white plaintiff can still establish a prima facie case with
evidence of background circumstances, but unlike Parker,a lack of such
evidence is not necessarily fatal.143 The Tenth Circuit determined that
when a plaintiff cannot prove background circumstances but does
present sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable inference of
discrimination, he should be entitled to proceed beyond the prima facie
stage.144 However, a majority plaintiff still must do more than just show
he was being treated differently than a similarly situated minority.14 5
The majority plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to support the
reasonable inference that but for the plaintiffs majority status, the
challenged decision would not have occurred.146
In Notari, a white male plaintiff brought an action against his
employer after an alleged discriminatory promotion of a female
employee.14 7 The suit arose after he had applied for a position as safety
and security coordinator for the Denver Water Works.148 During the
application process, the plaintiff and other candidates were interviewed

141. See id. at 802-03.
142. See id at 801 n.7. "The first prong of this test has been criticized by some courts as
impermissibly imposing a 'heightened standard' upon reverse discrimination plaintiffs." Id. (citing
Ulrich v. Exxon Co., 824 F. Supp. 677, 683-84 (S.D. Tex. 1993)). "We have serious misgivings
about the soundness of a test which imposes a more onerous standard for plaintiffs who are white or
male than for their non-white or female counterparts. Pierce, 40 F.3d at 801 n.7.
143. Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 589 (10th Cir. 1992).
144. See id. at 590.
145. See id.
146. See Adamson v. Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1150 (10th Cir.
2008).
147. Notari, 971 F.2d at 587.

148.

Id. at 586.
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and required to take oral examinations.14 9 After all the interviews were
finished, the hiring committee ranked him as the most qualified
candidate, and his name was submitted to the Director of Personnel (a
woman) who then rejected the committee's selection. 50 After deciding
that the position's focus should be shifted from "safety" to "security,"
the Director of Personnel conducted a reevaluation and selected a
woman whom the hiring committee deemed less qualified than the
plaintiff.1"' Despite these undisputed facts, the district court found that
plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence of background
circumstances to support an inference of reverse discrimination and thus
could not state a prima facie case.15 2
The Tenth Circuit reversed, setting forth an alternative to the
background circumstances test.' 53 The court framed the issue as follows:
[W]hether a reverse discrimination plaintiffs failure to allege
background circumstances necessarily compels a conclusion that he
has failed to state a prima facie case of intentional discrimination . .. in
other words, whether a disparate treatment plaintiffs failure to
demonstrate entitlement to the McDonnell Douglas presumption

forecloses his opportunity to prove that he was a victim of intentional
discrimination. We hold that it does not.154
The court reasoned that the McDonnell Douglas presumption
allows a plaintiff, absent direct evidence, to rely on strong indirect
evidence to prove that his employer discriminated against him. 5 5 For
minorities, a "lack of direct evidence is not fatal," as the four-prong test
will usually allow him to proceed.156 However, "[a]bsent unusual
circumstances, his white counterpart will not be so fortunate."' 5 Unlike
his minority counterpart, a white plaintiff who can provide strong
indirect evidence to support his claim, but lacks directs evidence of a
racially discriminatory motive, cannot raise the presumption of
discrimination.'15 "[Such a] result is untenable and inconsistent with the
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id
Id. at 586-87.
See id at 587.
Id. at 588.

153.

See id at589.

154.

Id

155.
156.

See id.at590.
See id. at 589.

157. Id. at 589-90.
158. See id. at 590 ("Under the modified McDonnell Douglas standard for reverse
discrimination. . . he states a prima facie case only if he can show background circumstances that
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goals of Title VII." 59
The court explained that any employee who puts forth sufficient
evidence that he was intentionally discriminated against should be able
to proceed beyond the prima facie case stage.' 60 The court adopted the
Fourth Circuit's standard in Holmes v. Bevilacqua,'61 which allows a
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case "by direct evidence of
discrimination or by indirect evidence whose cumulative probative
force, apart from the presumption's operation, would suffice under the
controlling standard to support as a reasonable probability the inference
that but for the plaintiffs race he would have been promoted."' 62 Thus,
to satisfy the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework, a white
plaintiff can provide direct evidence of background circumstances, or if
he is unable, he may provide sufficient evidence to support a reasonable
probability that but for the plaintiffs race, the adverse employment
action would not have taken place. 16 3 The court cautioned application of
this alternative however, emphasizing that a non-minority plaintiff must
present more evidence than his minority counterpart, as he is not entitled
to the same presumption implicit in the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case.'16
The Seventh Circuit adopted the Notari approach in Mills v. Health
16'
Prior to Mills, the court applied a test
Care Service Corporation.
similar to Parker, requiring a showing of "background circumstances
sufficient to demonstrate that the particular employer has reason or
inclination to discriminate invidiously against whites or evidence that
there is something fishy about the facts at hand."' 66 In Mills, the
plaintiff provided evidence that from 1988 to 1995, almost all
demonstrate that his employer is one of those unusual employer[s] who discriminate[s] against the
majority.").
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. 794 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1986).
162. See id at 146. Bevilacqua did not involve a claim of reverse discrimination. Id at 143.
163. Notari, 971 F.2d at 590.
164. See id. ("In other words, it is not enough, under this alternative formulation, for a plaintiff
merely to allege that he was qualified and that someone with different characteristics was the
beneficiary of the challenged employment decision. Instead, the plaintiff must allege and produce
evidence to support specific facts that are sufficient to support a reasonable inference that but for
plaintiffs status the challenged decision would not have occurred."). See also Reynolds v. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 69 F.3d 1523, 1534-35 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding plaintiff met burden
with evidence that she was the only white employee in the department and Hispanic supervisors
made almost all of the employment decisions of which plaintiff complains).
165. 171 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 1999).
166. Ineichen v. Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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promotions made by the defendant-employer went to women, and
females dominated the supervisory positions at the relevant office at the
time the challenged hiring decision was made. 167 Relying on Notari, the
court held that these facts were sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the
McDonnell Douglas framework.16 8
The court, agreeing with the presumption that it is the unusual
employer who discriminates against the majority, also believed that
majority plaintiffs should have to provide additional evidence to
preserve the "screening out benefits" served by the prima facie
analysis. 16 9 Thus, the court held that in reverse discrimination claims, "a
plaintiff... must show at least one of the background circumstances . . .
other courts have alluded to."o70 However, where a plaintiff is not able
to show background circumstances "but has established a logical reason
to believe that the [employer's] decision rests on a legally forbidden
ground, such as his race or gender," he may satisfy his burden under the
prima facie case.' 7 1 Other courts relying on Mills have allowed majority
plaintiffs to satisfy their burden under the modified first prong in a

variety of ways.172
C. ladimarco v. Runyon and the "Sufficient Evidence" Standard
The Third Circuit's pronouncement of a "sufficient evidence"
standard in ladimarco v. Runyon'73 expressly rejected all forms of
"background circumstances," deciding that a majority plaintiffs burden
at the prima facie stage of a Title VII claim should not differ from that of
167. Mills, 171 F.3d at 457.
168. See id at 456-57.
169. Id. at 456-57 (citing Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 134 (7th Cir.
1985)).
170. Mills, 171 F.3d at 457.
171. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. See DeWeese v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 120 F. Supp. 2d 735, 748-49 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(noting that courts have relied on Mills to apply a lower burden in reverse discrimination claims);
Rayl v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 87 F. Supp. 2d 870, 883-84 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (finding that plaintiff
met his burden with evidence that: (a) the employer expressed interest in hiring minority applicants;
(b) the employer had incentives to do so from the federal government; and, (c) that only two of
fifty-three employees in the relevant position were white males); Burton v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys.,
Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 841, 847 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (stating that background circumstances existed where
the plaintiff was told by a supervisor that despite having difficulties with black employees, he could
not fire them because they were protected minorities); Corral v. Chicago Faucet Co., No. 98-C5812, 2000 WL 628981, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2000) (holding that background circumstances
existed where the male plaintiff had been discharged for misconduct but produced evidence that a
female employee was only disciplined for the same conduct).
173. 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999).
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a minority plaintiff.17 4 Prior to the Third Circuit's decision, the
"background circumstances" standard was losing traction. At least one
writer pronounced that the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in Wilson v.
Bailey1 7 5 and Shealy v. City of Albany1 7 6 dealt the Parker standard the
greatest blow.177 In Wilson, two white deputy sheriffs in Jefferson
County, Alabama, were both certified twice as candidates for promotion,
but were never promoted.' 78 During the two certification processes, the
sheriff interviewed eight minority or women candidates, promoting six,
and interviewed eleven white males of whom five were promoted.17 9
Without discussion, the court wrote that the test for reverse
discrimination suits merely requires that plaintiff "belongs to a class" in
addition to the three other McDonnell Douglas prima facie
requirements.s 0
Five years later in Shealy, the court articulated the same standard in
a case involving five white firefighters who sued when, out of a pool of
six applicants, the only black applicant was promoted to the position of
battalion chief.'
Notably absent from either case is a discussion of
"background circumstances." In its silence, the Eleventh Circuit chose
the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework over the Parkerstandard,
essentially assuming as a formality that whites and males are protected
classes under Title VII.182 The Eleventh Circuit has strengthened its
standard in recent years with decisions in Bass v. Board of County
Commissioners'8 3 and Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.,184 echoing the
Supreme Court's reasoning in McDonald in holding that
"[d]iscrimination is discrimination no matter what the race . . . of the
victim."' 85 It cannot be said, however, that the Eleventh Circuit adopted
174. See id. at 163.
175. 934 F.2d 301 (1ith Cir. 1991).
176. 89 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 1996).
177. See Maria A. Citeroni, Note, ladimarco v. Runyon and Reverse Discrimination:Gaining
Majority Supportfor Majority Plaintiffs, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 579, 598-99 (2000). Citeroni claims
that the Second Circuit "wholly reject[s] the Parkercourt's modification of the McDonnellDouglas
standard." Id. at 597-98. While the Second Circuit seemingly has not applied the Parker standard, it
has not explicitly rejected it either. See infra Part IV.
178. Wilson, 934 F.2d at 303.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 304. The Jadimarcocourt found Wilson problematic in that that court never defined
the "class" to which plaintiffs belonged and essentially eliminated the first prong in the McDonnell
Douglas analysis sub silentio. ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 163 (3d Cir. 1999).
181. Shealy, 89 F.3d at 805.
182. See id.
183. 256 F.3d 1095 (11th Cir. 2001).
184. 644 F.3d 1321 (1lth Cir. 2011).
185. Bass, 256 F.3d at 1103; Smith, 644 F.3d at 1325 n.15.
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the reasoning in Jadimarco, as neither case so much as mentions
ladimarcoor "sufficient evidence."
The court in ladimarco recognized the difficulty in applying the
McDonnell Douglas framework to white plaintiffs, and announced that
"no universally accepted statement of the appropriate standard" had
emerged.186 The court remarked that a white plaintiff obviously cannot
satisfy the first prong of the test (membership in a minority group) in the
same way a black plaintiff can."' After giving a brief account of
Parker's "background circumstances" modification, and quoting
Harding'sclarification,' 88 the court noted several jurisdictions that have
concluded that the "background circumstances" substitution places a
more onerous burden on a white plaintiff than on any other protected
18 9
group.
Jadimarco ultimately rejected Parker,Harding, and their progeny
on several grounds. The court stated that the McDonnell Douglas
framework merely provided an allocation of burdens and order of
presentation of proof for a Title VII claim, the central focus being on
"'whether the employer is treating some people less favorably than
others because of their race . . ."'190

All that should be required to

establish a prima facie case is for the plaintiff to provide sufficient
evidence to allow a fact finder to conclude that the employer is treating
him or her less favorably because of their race.191
The court
acknowledged that the McDonnell Douglas framework was never meant
to be rigid, but requiring a majority plaintiff to state a prima facie case in
terms of "background circumstances" is still problematic.192
Many courts that have tried to apply the Parkerstandard, and those
that have rejected "background circumstances" have found that it
imposes a heightened burden on the plaintiff at the outset of his case.19 3
This heightened burden forces the plaintiff to present proof at the prima
facie stage that is ordinarily required only after the employer-defendant
has sustained their burden by proffering a legitimate, non-discriminatory
186.
187.

ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1999).
Id.

188.

Id. at 158-59.

189. Id. at 159 (citing Eastridge v. R.I. College, 996 F. Supp. 161, 161 (D.R.I. 1998)). The
court also discusses the Southern District of New York case Cully v. Milliman & Robertson, Inc.,
20 F. Supp. 2d 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See infra Part IV.B.3.
190. Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 160 (quoting Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978)).
191. Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 161.
192. Id.
193. See id.
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reason for the adverse employment action.194 The Parker modification
therefore undermines the purpose of the burden-shifting analysis: to
provide a vehicle for plaintiffs to bring discrimination claims that would
otherwise be difficult to prove.' 95 Moreover, the McDonnell Douglas
framework was not only intended to root out the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for adverse employment decisions, but also to
place the burden of production on the party with the easiest access to the
adverse decision-the employer.'96 "Background circumstances" does
not allow for this.
In addition to thwarting the purpose of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the Jadimarco court deemed the concept of background
circumstances "irremediably vague and ill-defined." 9 7 Further, the
circuits that have grappled with the concept have further modified it to
render the test unnecessary.' 9 8 The ladimarco court went even further to
criticize the Parker standard's ambiguity, stating courts that have
employed the standard have yet to come up with a clear definition of
"background circumstances," i.e., one that is "neither under nor over
inclusive, and possible to satisfy." 99
Finally, the court claimed the Parker standard leads to jury
confusion. 20 0
The court explained that ordinarily evidence of
"background circumstances" is introduced at the pretext stage after the
burden shifts to the employer, but under Parker, courts also use such
evidence to satisfy the first prong at the prima facie stage. 2 0 1 The use of
duplicative evidence can confuse jurors, creating an additional hardship
for non-minority plaintiffs.20 2 In sum, the court's complete retreat from
the Parker standard was a declaration that a plaintiff bringing a Title VII
reverse discrimination suit under the McDonnell Douglas framework
should be able to establish a prima facie case "by presenting sufficient
evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude (given the totality
of the circumstances) that the defendant treated plaintiff 'less favorably

194. See id
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. The court used Notari as an example of such a problematic decision. In refining its
"background circumstances" modification, the Tenth Circuit essentially removed the need to present
evidence of background circumstances, and a white plaintiff would only ever need to "present
sufficient evidence to support the reasonable probability of discrimination." Id. at 162.
199. Id. at 162-63.
200. Id. at 163.
201. See id
202. See id
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than others because of [his] race . . . .
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND A SURVEY OF DISTRICT COURT
DECISIONS

A. Second Circuit "Guidance"
The Second Circuit has been less than helpful in guiding lower
courts on how to apply one standard over the other in reverse
discrimination cases under the McDonnell Douglas framework. At least
one district court has suggested that McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall2 04 is
205
However, prior to
"instructive, if not determinative" on the issue.
McGuinness and up until Aulicino v. New York City Department of
Homeless Services206 (and the more recent Carroll v. City of Mount
Vernon),20 7 the Second Circuit had not explicitly adopted a Parker,
ladimarco, or other standard, and had consistently evaded the issue.
The assertion that McGuinness is "instructive, if not determinative"
grossly overstates that case's influence on deciding which standard
applies to the first prong. McGuinness merely asserts that the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination is minimal
208
Indeed, there is virtually no discussion of the
and not onerous.
plaintiffs satisfaction of the first prong other than the assertion that her
uncontested status as a white woman was part of her "minimal"
burden. 20 9 Absent from the analysis is any discussion of "background
circumstances" or an alternative standard.
Unlike McGuinness, Aulicino at least addresses the struggle in the
circuit courts between the Parkerand ladimarco standards, but the court
limits this discussion to a footnote.2 10 Since the defendants did not argue
that the plaintiff must proffer evidence of "background circumstances,"
the court did not see fit to submit a holding on the matter.211 To muddy
the waters further, the court declared in the same footnote that "in any
event ... there is sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
248, 253
209.
210.
211.

Id. (quoting Fumco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
263 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2001).
Tappe v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 177 F. Supp. 2d 176, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
580 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2009).
453 F. App'x 99 (2d Cir. 2011).
McGuinness, 263 F.3d at 53 (citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
(1981)).
McGuinness, 263 F.3d at 53.
See Aulicino, 580 F.3d at 80 n.5.
See id.
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conclude that both [defendants] harbored discriminatory animus against
white persons, facts that constitute 'background circumstances'
reflecting that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates
against the majority." 2 12 While this does not necessarily reflect an
endorsement of the "background circumstances" standard, it does not
represent an outright rejection either. Without adequate guidance, the
district courts have been split on whether to subject a majority plaintiff
to "background circumstances." While certain trends have emerged
from nearly twenty years of reverse discrimination cases, many of the
decisions discussed infra are inconsistent.
B. District Court Decisionsand Analysis
1. Olenick and the Adoption of Parker
Second Circuit district courts have squarely addressed which
standard should apply to the McDonnell Douglas framework several
times since 1995. In Olenick v. N. Y. Telephone/A NYNEX Co., 2 13 a pro
se plaintiff applied for a job at New York Telephone.2 14 As part of the
application process, she underwent a "Customer Contact Evaluation." 2 15
Plaintiff claimed she was discriminated against on account of race and
color when, among other things, defendant-employer did not take her
application.216 The court determined that the McDonnell Douglas
framework applied, 2 17 but because plaintiff did not belong to a racial
minority, her claims were subject "to a slightly altered analysis." 2 18
Citing Parker, Notari, and Murray, the court reasoned that a
plaintiff could prove their prima facie case when background
circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant was an employer
who typically discriminated against the majority. 219 The court did not
rely on any New York Southern District, Second Circuit, or U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, failing to mention McDonald's holding that
Title VII "proscribe[s] racial discrimination in private employment
against whites on the same terms as . .. nonwhites . . . ."220 The court
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
881 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 114.
Id.
See id
Plaintiff could not present direct evidence of discrimination. Id.
Id.
See id.
See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976).
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granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff
presented no evidence that defendant was the "unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority." 22 1
The Southern District's holding clearly established the adoption of
a heightened pleading standard of racial discrimination for white
plaintiffs, a standard that a member of a racial minority would satisfy
automatically by virtue of his or her race. Olenick is one of the first and
last decisions in the Southern District (and Second Circuit courts
generally) to adopt the Parkerheightened standard of pleading.
2. A Split in the District Courts: Cunlife and Umansky
The Connecticut District Court decision three years after Olenick
marked the beginning of a shift among Second Circuit district courts. In
Cunliffe v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.,222 plaintiff was terminated following
an investigation into allegations of sexual harassment.2 23 The plaintiff
claimed that an African American employee was accused and suspended
following two separate allegations of sexual harassment, and was only
terminated after a third accusation.2 24
Defendant argued that since plaintiff was Caucasian, he must also
show "background circumstances" as applied in Olenick.2 25 The court,
however, rejected this argument, declining to place an extra burden on
the plaintiff at the prima facie stage.226 The court was unwilling "to
presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group
will not discriminate against other members of that group."227
Four months after Cunliffe refused to apply "background
circumstances," the Southern District upheld the same standard. In
Umansky v. Masterpiece InternationalLtd.,228 plaintiff, a white female,
alleged discrimination and demanded more than two million dollars in
damages from defendant-employer. 2 29 The court made the curious
observation that as a woman, plaintiff was a member of a protected

221. Olenick, 881 F. Supp. at 114-15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. 9 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. Conn. 1998).
223. Id. at 127. Plaintiff filed a grievance that was submitted to an arbiter, who concluded
plaintiff was terminated for just cause. Id at 127-28.
224. Id. at 128.
225. See id.at 130 n.3.
226. Id
227. Id (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499
(1977)).
228. No. 96 Civ. 2367(AGS), 1998 WL 433779 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1998).
229. Id at * 1. Plaintiff alleged race, gender, and disability discrimination. Id.
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class, but was not similarly protected as a Caucasian.23 0 Working under
this presumption, the court applied the Parker "background
circumstances" standard 231 but failed to actually analyze any background
circumstances that led to their conclusion. The court simultaneously
acknowledged their use of a heightened standard,2 32 and recognized that
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous for a
plaintiff.233 Concerning plaintiff's protected class status and the
standard applied, the court did little to advance its case for using
"background circumstances" over a different standard.
3. Rejecting Olenick and "Background Circumstances:" Cully
Cully v. Milliman & Robertson, Inc. 2 34 served as the watershed case
in the Southern District, breaking from the court's decision in Olenick.
Although it did not espouse a clear standard, absent guidance from the
Second Circuit, it did support treating cases of traditional and reverse
discrimination with the same set of criteria. Plaintiff, a white female,
was hired as a secretary by the defendant.235 She was the only white
secretary assigned to a common work area with four other secretaries.236
Plaintiff claimed that soon after she started, the four other secretaries
began to harass her based on her race, making derogatory comments,
sabotaging her work, making veiled threats, and being generally
hostile. 237
After she was moved to a semi-private cubicle, the
harassment continued.2 38 In addition, she alleged that her one black
supervisor tolerated the harassment and became "abusive" and
"hypercritical" in dealing with plaintiff.2 39 Despite having no pretermination records of criticism and receiving compliments from one of
the managers, plaintiff was terminated during a meeting in which only
her black supervisor criticized her performance. 24 0 After plaintiff was
terminated, she filed a discriminatory discharge claim based on New

230.

Id. at *3 n.3.

231.
232.
233.
234.

See id
Id.
See id. at *3 (citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1973)).
20 F. Supp. 2d 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

235.

Id. at 638.

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
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York State and City law. 24 1 The court applied the McDonnell Douglas
framework to the claims, explaining that it applies equally to federal,
state, and municipal discrimination claims alike. 24 2
Three short years after Olenick, the court in Cully disagreed with
the assertion that a different legal standard should apply to claims of race
discrimination against a white plaintiff,243 suggesting that in some
circumstances it was willing to apply the protections of Title VII in a
colorblind manner. 244 The court further bolstered its decision by
observing "the glaring silence of the Second Circuit," noting that in the
absence of binding authority to the contrary, "McDonald means what it
says: a Title VII case is a Title VII case on the same terms for plaintiffs
of all races."24 5
The court also recognized the shifting demographic in the United
States and New York, where it is becoming more common for white
persons to be in a position as minorities in the workplace:
[I]n a majority-nonwhite office in a majority-nonwhite city in an
increasingly diverse country, it is not clear that whites are a majority

that we should doubt face racial discrimination. Discrimination
against nonwhites undoubtedly is the greater problem in the region and
the country; but in any particular social pocket, the tables may turn,
leaving it unclear which discrimination direction is the "reverse." 246
The court explained that the burden to establish a prima facie case
is low because all it does is force the defendant to offer an explanation,
and allegations may still fail after the prima facie showing.24 7
Furthermore, the McDonnell Douglas framework is outdated because all
races are protected classes, and only prongs two and four would ever be
*
248*
in dispute in- a discriminatory discharge
case.
The court's criticism of
the burden-shifting framework ultimately called for its abandonment,
asserting that all discrimination cases would "progress more sensibly
without the much criticized yo-yo rule about the shifting burden of

241. See id.
242. Id. at 640.
243. Id.
244. See O'Melveny & Myers, Court Allows Reverse Discrimination Claim by White
Secretary, 5 N.Y. EMP. L. LETTER, no. 12, Dec. 1998, at 2.
245. Cully, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 641 (internal quotation marks omitted).
246. Id.
247. See id
248. See id Prongs two and four are "satisfactory of job duties and circumstances giving rise
to an inference of discrimination." Id
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persuasion" and the confusing definition of a prima facie case. 249
Three Southern District cases decided in 2000 and 2001 signaled a
complete retreat from Olenick and "background circumstances" without
fully adopting Cully's reasoning behind abandoning the McDonnell
Douglas framework. In Berkowitz v. County of Orange,250 the court
determined that plaintiff Berkowitz was not a member of a protected
class under Title VII because he was a white male. 2 5 1 Berkowitz urged
the court to adopt the framework established by Parker, Olenick, and
Umansky, which would have required a showing that defendant was the
unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.2 52 The court
instead chose to apply the framework established by McDonald,
Cunlhffe, and Ticali v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn,2 53
announcing that without binding authority from the Second Circuit, "the
Court will assume that white persons, as a class, are protected from
discrimination against that class." 25 4
In DiLegge v. Gleason,255 the white male firefighter plaintiff was
denied twice for promotion in the Fire Department of the City of Mount
Vernon, New York.256 He had worked at the fire department since 1986,
and was the second-ranked candidate on a civil service eligible list for
one of two open lieutenant positions in 1999.257 The first- and thirdranked candidates were promoted, one a Caucasian, the other African
American. 251 On a motion for summary judgment, the defendants
argued that the court should have followed the heightened standard
articulated in Olenick.25 9 The court declined to do so, instead
articulating that courts confronted with summary judgment motions face
an ordinary standard of proof in civil litigation with few exceptions (this
case not being one of them). 2 60 Absent clear direction from the Second
Circuit or the Supreme Court to the contrary, the court found no reason
to adopt such a standard: "The Court rejects as unfounded the concept
articulated in Olenick . .. and a considerable number of unreported cases

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
120 F. Supp. 2d 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 397.
Id.
41 F. Supp. 2d 249 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
Berkowitz, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
131 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
See id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 522-23.
Id. at 523.
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which follow the logic of Olenick ... declining to approve a heightened
pleading standard in civil rights cases against a municipality." 2 6 1
In Tappe v. Alliance Capital Management, L.P.,262 a white male
plaintiff was fired from Alliance Capital on the day it was to pay bonus
compensation to its employees.263 His normal compensation was via
base salary and bonuses, the latter of which was substantially more.264
The explanation given to plaintiff as to why he did not receive a bonus
was that he "did not fit with the profile of the High Yield Group and its
strategy going forward." 2 65 The four other portfolio managers in
plaintiffs group included three women (one of whom was black), and
one white male.266 The court held that the plaintiff was a member of a
protected group and did not need to allege "background circumstances"
to satisfy the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework.26 7 The
court acknowledged the split among the federal circuit courts, as well as
the variance in the Southern District, 268 and chose to follow McDonald,
highlighting the fact that the Supreme Court held Title VII to prohibit a
discriminatory preference against any racial group, minority or
majority.269 The court's analysis went further, and held that the Supreme
Court has "steadfastly held male plaintiffs to the same standard as
female plaintiffs-no more or less."270
The Tappe court placed a special emphasis on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, inferring that enforcement of a
heightened burden standard such as "background circumstances" may
violate the clause.
No one doubts that the "background circumstances" test, if adopted,
would place a higher burden on Tappe than a "traditional" plaintiffafter all, if Tappe was black, for example, he would not be required to
allege any background circumstances. Such differential treatment, if
adopted, would raise a serious question because treating plaintiffs
differently because of their race or sex triggers heightened
261. Id. (citations omitted). The court added that "[w]hether or not the analysis of Olenick is
followed, a [C]aucasian plaintiff may not holler discrimination and survive a summary judgment
motion simply because the political leadership of the city resides with a minority." Id,
262. 177 F. Supp. 2d 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
263. Id. at 179.
264. See id.
265. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. Id.
267. See id at 181-83.
268. Id. at 181.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 182.
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constitutional scrutiny. 271
In its discussion of the Equal Protection Clause, the court
concluded that where an alternative interpretation of a statute is "fairly
possible" in light of an otherwise acceptable construction that raises
serious constitutional problems, courts construe the statute to avoid such
problems.272 Interpreting Title VII to mean that all plaintiffs, regardless
of race, have the same pleading burden is more than "fairly possible"
and in fact "flows from Title VII's plain language as well as the
precedent of the Supreme Court and this Circuit." 2 73 Accordingly, the
court found that plaintiff had satisfied the first prong,274 therefore
upholding the Cully line of reasoning.
4. New York's Eastern and Western Districts
Six months after Cully was decided in the Southern District, New
York's Eastern District decided to sidestep the modified McDonnell
Douglas framework.
In Ticali v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn,275 the plaintiff, a white female elementary school teacher, sued
her parochial school employer for, inter alia, discrimination based on
race, claiming that the school planned to fire white lay teachers and
replace them with Hispanic nuns from Argentina.27 6 The court held that
she was not a member of a protected class in a Title VII race
discrimination claim, therefore necessitating the use of a "reverse
discrimination" framework.277
Instead of following the "background circumstances" standard
espoused by Parkerand Olenick, or the standard applied by Cully and its
progeny, the court chose to follow the Supreme Court's advice in U.S.
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,2 78 switching the focus to
whether an inference may be drawn from the demonstrated facts that the
employer treated plaintiff less favorably because of his race. 2 79 This
"simplified approach to weighing and evaluating evidence of

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id.
Id. at 183.
Id.
See id
41 F. Supp. 2d 249 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 260.
460 U.S. 711 (1983).
Ticali, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 261.
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discrimination"280 abandoned the McDonnell Douglas framework and
focused on the actual evidence presented. Under this approach, a court
is charged with evaluating plaintiffs direct or indirect proof, then
evaluating defendant's proof that it did not discriminate, and finally,
analyzing the evidence as a whole. 28 1 The court's inquiry focused on
"whether the plaintiff has proven that it is more likely than not that the
employer's decision was motivated at least in part by an impermissible
or discriminatory reason." 28 2 The Ticali framework maintained the
assumption that persons of all races are members of a protected class,283
but focused on the actual evidence, direct or indirect, of a potentially
discriminatory act.
The anomalous holding in Ticali has been all but abandoned in the
Eastern District as is evident by the standard applied in Stepheny v.
Brooklyn Hebrew School for Special Children.284 Plaintiff, a white
woman, was terminated from her job along with her husband, a black
male, for their involvement in an extramarital affair. 2 85 The plaintiff
claimed she was terminated because she was white.286 Without much
discussion, the court adopted an approach similar to Cully, following the
reasoning in McDonald that "Title VII prohibits racial discrimination
against whites on the same terms as racial discrimination against nonwhites."2 87 The court noted that Olenick, in adopting the "background
circumstances" standard, "did not cite to or attempt to distinguish"
McDonald, and therefore found no reason to adopt Olenick's line of
reasoning.2 88
Within the constraints of the McDonnell Douglas
framework (which the court re-established as the standard for analyzing
a prima facie case of reverse discrimination),28 9 the court found that "the
standard of proof for a plaintiff to establish a primafacie case of reverse
employment discrimination is the same in all cases."2 90
As of this writing, New York's Western District has had the last
word among Second Circuit district courts over which standard to apply

280. See Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified
Methodfor Assessing Evidence in DiscriminationCases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 661 (1998).
281. Id at 673.
282. Id.
283. See Cully, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
284. 356 F. Supp. 2d 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
285. See id at 254-57.
286. Id. at 258.
287. Id. at 259 n.9 (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976)).
288. See id
289. Id at 258.
290. Id. at 259 n.9 (emphasis in original).
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to the McDonnellDouglas framework. In Allaire v. HSBC Bank USA,21
plaintiff, a white male, worked for defendant for ten years.292 While
overseeing the Commercial Finance Department in Dallas, he discovered
293
After reporting this to his
discrepancies in required loan documents.
supervisor, he agreed to conduct a more thorough self-audit of the
294
After being transferred back to the Buffalo office,
department.
defendant's Audit Department reviewed the Dallas office and
a
291
ratrh
Shortly thereafter, he was
downgraded plaintiffs performance rating.
terminated and replaced by a black female who had been employed by
defendant for three years before plaintiff was hired.296
Defendant argued that plaintiff would need to show "background
circumstances" because he was not a member of a protected class for
purposes of Title VII claims.297 The court acknowledged that the
Second Circuit had not specifically resolved the issue, but has "declined
to apply such a heightened burden in a recent case involving a white
plaintiffs employment discrimination claim." 2 9 8 After noting that the
Supreme Court has also rejected a heightened standard of proof for
majority plaintiffs, the court declined to apply the pleading standard
proposed by defendant, holding that plaintiff had satisfied the first prong
of the McDonnell Douglas framework.2 99
In 2011, the same district court weighed in on reverse
discrimination in Adamczyk v. N.Y. State Department of Correctional
Services.30o Acknowledging McDonald,Parker, Tappe, ladimarco,and
the absence of an express adoption by the Second Circuit of any test, the
court determined that it was not inclined to apply a higher standard of
proof in reverse discrimination suits. 3 0' The court explained that "[a]
plaintiffs burden to establish a prima facie case is supposed to be a

minimal one." 30 2

291.

No. 00-CV-0084E(SC), 2003 WL 23350119 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2003), aff'd, 109 F.

App'x 477 (2d Cir. 2004).
292.
293.
294.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.

295.

See id.

296. Id. at *2.
297. Id. at *3.
298. Id. (citing to McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2001)).
299. See id at *3-4.
300. No. 07-CV-523S, 2011 WL 917980 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2011), affd, 474 F. App'x 23
(2d Cir. 2012).
301. Adamczyk,2011 WL 917980, at *5.
302. Id. (emphasis in original).
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V. SOLUTIONS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Determining how to modify the McDonnell Douglas standard in
reverse discrimination claims essentially boils down to three
alternatives: (a) the Parker standard of providing "background
circumstances" at the pleading stage; (b) the modified "background
circumstances" standard applied in Notari; (c) or the ladimarco
"sufficient evidence" standard, which does not subject a majority
plaintiff to a heightened burden. Despite the absence of guidance from
the Second Circuit, one principle has emerged from the district courts:
the Parker standard is no longer controlling.303 What is unclear is
whether the Second Circuit is best served by reverting to the Parker
standard or whether it should adopt the more loosely-defined standards
of proof in either Notari or ladimarco.
A. Parkerand "BackgroundCircumstances"
Two pervasive arguments support Parker. First, proponents of the
"background circumstances" requirement argue that application of a
heightened burden for majority plaintiffs is consistent with the spirit of
Title VII. 30 4 The Civil Rights Act was meant to aid the plight of African
Americans.30 s It is well established that Title VII was intended to break
down barriers in employment for minorities, particularly for African
Americans.306 Thus, application of the same test to all racial groups may
contradict the legislative intent. 307 Simply put, "Title VII was not
enacted merely to enforce like treatment of all individuals but was
instead enacted primarily as a means of improving the economic status
of Blacks and other minorities."30 s Proponents of Parkerconclude that a
heightened burden on non-minorities is consistent with the Act's
purpose.309 It follows that removing the heightened burden on majority
plaintiffs must require a judicial determination that Title VII has
achieved its purpose of removing barriers in employment for minorities,
and that such additional protection is no longer needed. 3 10 This dubious
303. See id.
304. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 36, at 84.
305. See 110 CONG. REC. 1511 (1964) (statement of Rep. Madden).
306. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). See also 110 CONG.
REc. 6548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
307. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 36, at 84.
308. Id.
309. See id.
310. See id. ("[Removing a heightened burden] would also send an implicit message to
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conclusion falls outside permissible judicial determinations, but also
ignores that the McDonnell Douglas framework "was premised not on
the fact that minorities are discriminated against in modem society, but
rather on the fact that they were traditionally disfavored," compared to
the majority, and therefore, "the issue of which groups in today's society
experience unfavorable treatment is irrelevant."3 11
Another argument supporting Parker is that the McDonnell
Douglas framework demonstrates judicial enforcement of the legislative
purpose of Title VII. The framework provides that "when a qualified,
presumptively disadvantaged person has been the object of an adverse
employment decision regarding an available position, the individual has
established a presumption of discrimination." 3 12 It is argued that the sole
purpose of the McDonnell Douglas test is to determine whether
discrimination against a plaintiff be inferred from the circumstances.3 13
The validity of the presumption of discrimination depends on the
plaintiff s membership in a historically disadvantaged group.314
The rationale of affording minorities this presumption is simple:
Congress recognized that minorities faced discriminatory practices in
employment that whites did not.315 Such practices placed them at a
disadvantage historically, and Title VII was passed to help them
overcome these barriers.3 16 While Title VII does protect both minority
and majority plaintiffs, "[t]he historical facts of discrimination mean that
a presumption of discrimination coincides with certain identities and not
others," and membership in a class that has historically faced
discrimination "establishes a presumption of unlawful discrimination for
those individuals who possess identities likely to subject them to
prohibited forms of discrimination. . . ."31 Thus, Parker'sreliance on
"background circumstances" is logical because without membership in a
historically disadvantaged group, an inference of discrimination often
defies common sense and affords additional protections not warranted
Whites ... that discrimination against Blacks and other minorities is no longer a problem.")
311. Brenda D. DiLuigi, Note, The Notari Alternative: A Better Approach to the Square-PegRound-Hole Problem Found in Reverse DiscriminationCases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 353, 371 (1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
312. Cunningham, supranote 82, at 452.
313. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 36, at 64.
314. See Cunningham, supra note 82, at 452 ("[A]lthough individuals with privileged
identities are protected under the statute, a privileged individual may not rely on his identity to
establish an inference of discrimination.").
315. See id.
316. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)).
317. See Cunningham, supranote 82, at 453-54 (footnote omitted).
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by historical practice or statutory intent.' 18 The Parker approach
preserves reliance on the McDonnell Douglas framework because,
without additional facts that demonstrate the requisite background
circumstances, any inference of discrimination is unfounded and does
not justify the presumption of discrimination.
Despite sound arguments in favor of adopting the Parkerapproach,
it would make the least sense in the Second Circuit considering that
approach has been widely rejected among the district courts, either
explicitly or by implication. Several problems with the Parker standard
have already been highlighted-including its heightened pleading
requirements and amorphous definition-but the principle of stare
decisis has only been discussed by implication and may in fact foreclose
the Second Circuit from applying the Parkerstandard." 9 In its broadest
form, stare decisis is "'the preferred course because it promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process."' 320 The Supreme Court has
ruled that this principle is one of policy, not a "mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision,",321 and is given special force in cases of
statutory interpretation due to the legislature's involvement and freedom
to alter the Court's decision.322 The Second Circuit should explicitly
disregard Parkerin the interest of precedent.32 3
In the interest of uniformity and creating an unbroken, consistent
body of law, the Second Circuit should apply a test that does not modify
the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework in such a way as to
impose more than a "minimal" burden on a majority plaintiff.32 4 Second
Circuit cases have explicitly and continuously allowed a majority
plaintiff to satisfy the first prong without having to prove "background
circumstances."32 5 Imposing the Parker standard would not only break
318. See Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1981).
319. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911-12 (2010) (identifying
the factors relevant in deciding whether or not to adhere to stare decisis, including 'the antiquity of
the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and . . .whether the decision was well reasoned."').
320. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 827 (1991)).
321. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119(1940).
322. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989).
323. United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir. 2001) ("We are bound by
[precedent] unless it has been called into question by an intervening Supreme Court decision or by
one of this Court sitting in banc.").
324. See McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2001).
325. See id. See also Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 80 n.5
(discussing "background circumstances" but failing to adopt it); Carroll v. City of Mount Vernon,
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from most recent district court decisions, but also would create a
different set of circumstances for a majority plaintiff that has thus far not
proven to be unworkable or antiquated.32 6
However, stare decisis may not control because the Second Circuit
has not articulated sound and clear reasoning for its silence and implicit
rejection of Parker. Since any decision is at the court's discretion, the
Second Circuit may be persuaded by a defendant challenging the first
prong standard.327 It is not implausible that the Second Circuit would
adopt Parker in light of a well-reasoned challenge that the "minimal"
burden of a majority plaintiff includes proving a set of background
circumstances.328 At a minimum, the Second Circuit likely will continue
to apply a burden-shifting scheme that does not differentiate between
majority and minority plaintiffs.
A common criticism of Parker is that it results in making it more
difficult for non-minority plaintiffs to bring a claim. 32 9 The Sixth Circuit
questioned whether "the background circumstances prong, only required
of reverse discrimination plaintiffs, may impermissibly impose a
heightened pleading standard on majority victims of discrimination." 330
Opponents of Parker argue that, because plaintiffs in Title VII claims
often must rely solely on indirect evidence of discrimination, requiring
additional facts to present a prima facie case contradicts the Supreme
Court's reasoning for the McDonnell Douglas framework.33 1 Under
Parker, a minority plaintiff may rely on indirect evidence of
discrimination, whereas a white plaintiff, lacking direct evidence of
background circumstances, may not. 3 32 Non-minorities may become
discouraged from asserting their rights, a result that is inequitable and
contrary to the objectives underlying Title VII. 3 33 Moreover, the test
ignores the fact that, even if an employer has never discriminated against
453 F. App'x 99 (2011) (no discussion of "background circumstances"); Vallone v. Lori's Natural
Foods Ctr., Inc., No. 98-9388, 1999 WL 1012668, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 12, 1999) ("This Court has
applied the same burden-shifting to claims of 'regular' discrimination-i.e., where the plaintiff is a
member of a historically disfavored group-as well as to claims of reverse discrimination-i.e., where
the plaintiff is not a member of a historically disfavored group.").
326. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911-12 (2010).
327. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 131 (2005).
328. Iadimarco essentially abrogated lower court decisions within the Third Circuit, reversing
a course ofjurisprudence that employed the Parkerstandard. Citeroni, supra note 177, at 599.
329. See ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999).
330. Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
331. See DiLuigi,supranote 311, at 372.
332. See id.
333. Id.
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non-minorities, he may have discriminated against the plaintiff under the
alleged circumstances. 33 4 Thus, a non-minority plaintiff may not survive
the prima facie stage with strong indirect evidence of discrimination
unless there is direct evidence of the employer's history of reverse
discrimination.
Parker's background circumstances test has also been criticized for
being ill-defined and vague.335 While the test requires proof that the
defendant discriminates against the majority, "if a racial 'minority'
constitutes a racial 'majority' in a particular locality, the 'traditionally
disfavored' presumption should not be applicable."336 It follows that a
rigid application requiring a minority to be a member of a "traditionally
disfavored group" may be "an inequitable assumption about modem
society."337 Whether or not this premise is correct, opponents make it
clear that "[t]he absence of coherent substantive content is sufficient
reason to consider a different approach."338
B. The Notari Modification
The approach set forth in Notari presents an interesting
compromise between Parker and ladimarco. Essentially, Notari
provides that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case either by
background circumstances sufficient to raise an inference of reverse
discrimination, or by offering indirect evidence "sufficient to support a
reasonable probability" that, but for the plaintiffs race, the challenged
employment action would not have occurred.339 While direct evidence
of background circumstances may not be required, the plaintiff is still
not entitled to the presumption of discrimination implicit in the
McDonnell Douglas framework.3 4 0
Proponents of this standard argue it "provides a reasonable
alternative to the reverse discrimination plaintiff who lacks sufficient

334. Timothy K. Giordano, Different Treatment for Non-Minority Plaintiffs Under Title VII: A
Call for Modification of the Background Circumstances Test to Ensure That Separate Is Equal, 49
EMORY L.J. 993, 1020 (2000).
335. Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of Traditional and
Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1031, 1080 (2004) (noting that
the background circumstances test "is more a label than a test" and is comprised of many different
approaches).
336. Citeroni, supra note 177, at 596.
337. Id. at 596-97.
338. Sullivan, supra note 335, at 1080.
339. Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 590 (10th Cir. 1992).
340. Id
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evidence to establish a prima facie case under the Parker approach."34 1
Like Parker, it requires a heightened burden in reverse discrimination
cases, thus preserving Title VII's primary objective and the justification
for the presumption of discrimination established in the McDonnell
Douglas framework. 34 2 Unlike Parker,it allows a non-minority plaintiff
to state a prima facie case based solely on indirect evidence of
discrimination.34 3 Therefore, "the availability of an alternative means of
proof serves to rectify some of the infirmities created by the imposition
of an elevated standard." 3" This alternative recognizes the rationale
behind the modification Parker imposes while establishing an equitable
scheme that allows plaintiffs to prove reverse discrimination.34 5 "By
easing the burden on reverse discrimination plaintiffs and allowing for
the use of indirect evidence, the Notari alternative is consistent with the
spirit of Title VII and remains true to its purpose of enforcing the
provisions embodied in the statute."34 6
Commentators have criticized Notari for imposing a heightened
standard on non-minority plaintiffs.34 7 Opponents argue that the
alternative approach has not placed non-minority plaintiffs in a better
situation than those subject to the Parkertest.3 48 It follows that Notari is
deficient for the same reasons as Parker.
[I]t is not clear how the "but for" test is any easier to meet than the
Parker standard, especially in light of the fact that one of the most
successful ways of making such a "but for" showing undoubtedly
would be through proving a fact akin to the Parker requirement that
the defendant regularly discriminates against the majority. 349
As a result, "[i]t seems likely that the plaintiff must prove
341. DiLuigi, supranote 311, at 375.
342. See id. at 375-76.
343. See id at 376.
344. Id. at 376.
345. See id
346. Id.
347. See Scott Black, McDonnell Douglas' Prima Facie Case and the Non-Minority Plaintiff
Is Modification Required?, 1994 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 309, 348-49 (1995).

348. See Citeroni, supra note 177, at 601. "[lIt would be a daunting task to convince a
majority plaintiff that he is placed in a better position under the Notari standard when he must twice
attempt to adduce evidence[] at the prima facie stage of litigation" where his minority counterpart
would not. Id.
349. Black, supra note 347, at 349 ("Even more puzzling is the court's statement that 'a given
employer may discriminate against an individual white worker even when no evidence demonstrates
that the employer generally favors workers who belong to historically disadvantaged groups."'). See
also Citeroni, supranote 177, at 602.
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something like background circumstances, even under this alternative
formulation., 350 Thus, under Notari the plaintiff will still face obstacles
not applicable to minority plaintiffs, and, like Parker,these obstacles are
very difficult to overcome in cases where the plaintiff can only provide
indirect evidence to support his claim. 51
C. ladimarco andthe "Sufficient Evidence" Standard
ladimarco effectively guarantees that a majority plaintiffs claim of
reverse discrimination will not be foreclosed at the prima facie stage if
he is unable to prove any "background circumstances."
One
commentator has suggested that maintaining a uniform standard for all
plaintiffs will encourage employers to be more "conscious of the
legitimacy of their actions" so as to avoid opening the floodgates for
suits from majority plaintiffs. 3 52 Regardless of its impact on future Title
VII suits, ladimarco sidestepped the "intractable problem of what
constitutes background circumstances and avoids the intellectually
disingenuous approach of courts that have continued to use the label"
while departing from the intent of the Parker court. 353
Iadimarco alters the method of proof in the traditional McDonnell
Douglas framework in favor of a more "holistic assessment" of evidence
in a Title VII claim.354 In taking this holistic approach, ladimarco
eschews reliance on predictions of human behavior on which McDonnell
Douglas and Parker rely-that "cross-racial discrimination is more
common than intra-racial discrimination." 3 55 The ladimarco standard,
however, maintains a true burden-shifting configuration, and a judge
will still have to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to find
discrimination after the employer has presented a nondiscriminatory
reason for an adverse employment action, even when a white employee
sues a white employer.3 56 In certain areas of New York, it is becoming
more common for a white person to be in the minority, prompting courts
in those jurisdictions to utilize a ladimarco-stylemodification of the first
prong. 357 These results suggest that a "sufficient evidence" approach

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Sullivan, supra note 335, at 1071.
Black, supra note 347, at 349.
Citeroni, supra note 177, at 600.
Sullivan, supra note 335, at 1118-19.
Idat 1129.
Id. at 1129-30.
Id. at 1130.
See Cully v. Milliman & Robertson, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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serves the same purpose for white plaintiffs as a traditional approach
would for minority plaintiffs in predominantly white areas. Even in
cases where a white plaintiff lives and/or works in a predominantly
minority-populated area, the ladimarco standard is not likely to
automatically confer an inference of discrimination.
Despite leveling the playing field for all plaintiffs in Title VII
employment discrimination claims, eliminating the requirement of a
formal proof structure may create an impediment to reverse
discrimination suits. 359 One commentator singled out Tappe as a prime
example of how modifying the McDonnell Douglas framework with a
"sufficient evidence" approach would fly in the face of the original
intent of Title VII and the McDonnell Douglas framework, and would
further cripple efforts to diversify the workplace because of the looming
threat of liability after every adverse employment decision.360
Title VII was clearly intended to secure full civil rights for African
Americans, not to secure rights for white citizens.3 61 Several statements
from House debates at the time of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 echo this
purpose: opponents of the bill conceded that it was intended to improve
the lives of African Americans,3 62 and proponents argue the legislation
was required to address the "moral outrage" regarding discrimination
against them. 36 3 Nowhere in the debates in either the House or the
Senate was it apparent that whites were in need of protection from
discrimination in employment or otherwise. 3 6 The Senate debates were
more contentious, but they ultimately agreed that Title VII was primarily
intended to benefit African Americans, and that discrimination against
whites in the employment sphere was non-existent.365
If one accepts the presumption that Title VII protects members of
all races equally, then ladimarco's reasoning undermines not only the
legislative intent of the Act, but also the McDonnell Douglas framework,
essentially reducing it to one prong.366
By refusing to apply
358. See, e.g., DiLegge v. Gleason, 131 F. Supp. 2d 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[A] caucasian
plaintiff may not holler discrimination ... simply because the political leadership of the city resides
with a minority.").
359. See Sullivan, supra note 335, at 1119.
360. Michael J. Fellows, Note, Civil Rights - Shades of Race: An Historically Informed
Reading of Title VII, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 387, 421-24 (2004).
361. See 110 CONG. REc. 1512 (1964) (statement of Rep. Madden arguing for the enactment
of "The Civil Rights Act of 1963").
362. 110 CONG. REc. 1515 (1964) (statement of Rep. Colmer).
363. 110 CONG. REc. 1521 (1964) (comments of Rep. Celler).
364. Fellows, supranote 360, at 401.
365. Id. at 402.
366. Id. at 420 (applying the reasoning in Tappe, which is similar to ladimarco in that it does
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"background circumstances" and only requiring "sufficient evidence" of
discrimination based on a protected trait, as in ladimarco,367 district
courts have failed to satisfy the essential function of the McDonnell
Douglas test itself, "which is to 'raise[ ] an inference of discrimination
because [of employment actions that], if otherwise unexplained, are
more likely than not based on consideration of impermissible
factors.' 3 68 Iadimarco would fail to eliminate other reasonable
explanations for the termination of a white employee, and it would not
make sense to require an employer to explain the decision to dismiss a
white employee based on non-prohibited criteria.369 Instead, based on
the history of Title VII and the purpose behind the McDonnell Douglas
test, the burden should fall on the white employee to prove that his firing
was the result of invidious discrimination.3 70
The Second Circuit's adoption of Jadimarco could also stifle
legitimate employment decisions to diversify and correct the historical
imbalance for which Title VII was enacted. Michael J. Fellows
succinctly explains this catch-22:
As workplaces become more diverse, whenever any worker is fired
perhaps he will have a claim under Title VII. All he need show is that
someone of a different race did not perform as well, this despite the
fact that 'there is rarely a single, best qualified person for a job.'
Employers who attempt to bring diversity into the workplace will be
subject to lawsuits under the very statute designed to bring diversity
into the workplace.... Title VII, an anti-discrimination statute, may
thus become a statute used to harass employers and constrict their
legitimate business decisions. 371
Thus, applying a "sufficient evidence" standard has the potential
not only to undermine Title VII, but would make nearly every legitimate
employment decision subject to a Title VII lawsuit. While no empirical
evidence exists to suggest that reverse discrimination claims would spike
if the Second Circuit adopts the "sufficient evidence" standard, Fellows
not apply the "background circumstances" standard and treats the white plaintiff as any other
plaintiff alleging Title VII race discrimination).
367. ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1999).
368. Fellows, supra note 360, at 420 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
369. Id. at 421 (criticizing the reasoning of Tappe and Justice Rehnquist's dissent in United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), both of which support Title VHl's
colorblind and neutral application).
370. Fellows, supranote 360, at 421.
371. Id. at 421-22 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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suggests that white applicants would always have a prima facie Title VII
claim whenever an employer hires a less-qualified minority applicant. 372
VI. CONCLUSION

The Second Circuit should explicitly adopt the ladimarco approach
in reverse discrimination claims where modification of the first prong of
the McDonnellDouglas standard is appropriate. Stare decisis should not
foreclose the Second Circuit from adopting the "background
circumstances" standard because that court has yet to address the issue,
and the relevant precedent is too inconsistent to distill any standard.373
However, a "background circumstances" standard would cut against the
current trend in district courts that apply an approach similar to that of
ladimarco's "sufficient evidence" standard.374 Given the heightened
burden that is unavoidable under Parker, embracing "background
circumstances" as the solution would be contrary to the Second Circuit's
own conclusion that the burden on a majority plaintiff should not be

onerous. 375
The Notari standard maintains the admirable elements of the
"background circumstances" approach while providing a "but-for"
totality of the evidence catchall in claims lacking direct evidence of
background circumstances.
Even though Notari suffers from the same
amorphous consequences that plague the "background circumstances"
standard, it is an admirable attempt to preserve the purpose of Title VII
while recognizing the dilemma facing majority plaintiffs who may only
be able to provide indirect evidence of discrimination. 7 However, this
approach still suffers most of the pitfalls of Parker,and can essentially
be boiled down to the same standard, leading to the conclusion that
Notari is a mere masquerade of Parker.
Jadimarco is the sensible standard to adopt because it does not
impose a heightened pleading standard, but rather treats every Title VII
claimant alike regardless of race.378 The United States has not shaken its
legacy of slavery and disparate treatment of minorities, as invidious
discrimination and impermissible discriminatory motives still exist. It is

372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id. at 422.
See discussionsupra Part V.A-B.
See discussionsupra Part IV.B.2-4.
See McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2001).
See discussionsupra Part III.B., V.B.
See Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 590 (10th Cir. 1992).
See ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999).
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true that Title VII was meant to correct the historical imbalance against
African Americans and other historically disfavored groups, and that the
"background circumstances" modification was established with this
same intent in mind.3 79 However, it is unclear whether this method is
appropriate to interpret the meaning of Title VII in 2012. As racial
minorities begin to outnumber the current majority, it will be difficult to
justify the rationale behind Parkerand Notari. Some of the district court
cases discussed in this Note, particularly those in urban areas, have
already recognized this issue.
A majority plaintiff has a difficult time satisfying the prima facie
Requiring
requirements for reverse discrimination as it stands.
additional evidence at the pleading stage only makes it more difficult.
Iadimarco applies uniformly, regardless of one area's racial
demographic. 3 8 1 A white plaintiff will have the same pleading
requirements and inferences drawn under a "sufficient evidence"
standard as under the McDonnell Douglas framework.38 2 Any backlash
of litigation against employers attempting to diversify is speculative at
best. Regardless of whether the district courts have adopted ladimarcolike reasoning, or whether stare decisis controls, the Second Circuit
should expressly adopt its "sufficient evidence" approach and interpret
the Title VII prima facie burden consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in McDonald: a Title VII claim is a Title VII claim for all
plaintiffs, regardless of race.
Ryan Mainhardt*& William Volet**

379. See Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
380. See discussion supraPart IV.B.3.
381. See ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 161.
382. See id. at 163.
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